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O Direito Internacional Público como Jogo Institucional

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n2p179-195

http://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/index 

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Alexandre L. dos Santos1

 

Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo avaliar como a Análise Econômica do Direito pode ser aplicada ao estudo do Direito Internacional Público. Partindo do pressuposto de que os agentes do Direito Internacional, sobretudo os Estados, atuam pragmaticamente como entes racionais, maximizadores de seus próprios interesses, busca-se mostrar que a inexistência de um sistema formalmente institucionalizado de imposição de sanções não torna o Direito Internacional ineficaz, pois a estrutura de incentivos dos Estados não se limita a um suposto receio de serem submetidos a coerções formais.

Palavras-chave: Direito Internacional Público, Análise Econômica do Direito, Teoria da Escolha Racional, Nova Economia Institucional, Teoria dos Jogos.

 

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to assess how Law and Economics can be applied to the study of Public International Law. Taking as a fact that the agents of International Law, mainly States, act pragmatically as rational entities, which maximize their own interests, it intends to show that the inexistence of a formally institutionalized system of sanctions does not make International Law ineffective, as the incentives framework of States is not limited to their supposed fear of being subjected to formal coercion.

Key words: Public International Law, Law and Economics, Rational Choice Theory, New Institutional Economics, Game Theory.

 

1 Mestrando em Direito Internacional Econômico, Universidade Católica de Brasília – UCB. Grupo de Pesquisa em Direito & Economia - GPDE Departamento de Direito –UCB/DF

 

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