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Quebra Eficiente de Contratos Bilaterais e a Teoria dos Incentivos

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n2p241-253

http://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/index 

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Juliana T. M. Akaishi1

 

Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a busca pela eficiência em situações em que a um dos contratantes tem estímulo para romper umcontrato bilateral anteriormente celebrado. Paratanto, comparam-se a quebra eficiente do contrato e a Teoria dos Incentivos, levando-se em conta as diversas críticas feitas a ambas e busca-se verificar qual a solução mais vantajosa para se obter a maior eficiência.

Palavras-chave: Quebra Eficiente, Contrato Bilateral, Teoria dos Incentivos.

 

Abstract: This paper proposes efficiency enhancing strategies in bargaining contexts where one of the parties has an incentive to breach a bilateral contract previously established. The efficient breach doctrine is critically compared with the Incentives Theory in search of a socially desirable outcome, that is, efficiency enhancing.

Key words: Efficient Breach, Bilateral Contract, Incentives Theory.

 

1 Bacharel em Direito pela Universidade de São Paulo

 

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