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O Favorecimento do Vendedor em Contratos de Adesão

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n1p155-169

http://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/index 

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João F. M. Guarisse1 & Bruno B. Becker2

 

Resumo: Os contratos de adesão são comumente vistos com desconfiança por juristas, que apontam para o fato de que a maioria de suas cláusulas favorece desproporcionalmente a parte vendedora. Este artigo busca compreender esse suposto enviesamento dos contratos de adesão a partir de uma óptica econômica. Assim, são analisadas quatro teorias que tentam explicar os contratos de adesão. Primeiro, a hipótese de que os contratos de adesão são fruto do poder de mercado da parte que o redige; segundo, a hipótese de que há uma assimetria de informações entre consumidor e fornecedor; terceiro, a ideia de que os consumidores sofrem vieses cognitivos que os impede de avaliar adequadamente cláusulas não-salientes; quarto, a noção de que os fornecedores, ao contrário dos consumidores, preocupam-se com sua reputação no mercado, de forma que redigem contratos que os protejam de consumidores oportunistas.

Palavras-chave: Contratos de Adesão, Análise Econômica do Direito, Poder de Mercado, Assimetria de Informações, Economia Comportamental, Reputação.

 

Abstract: Adhesion contracts are commonly viewed with suspicion by lawyers. They point to the fact that the clauses in those agreements usually favor the seller disproportionably. This article aims to understand this alleged pro-seller bias from an economic standpoint. Four theories have been analyzed. First, the hypothesis that adhesion contracts are the result of market power of the drafting party; second, the assumption that there is an asymmetry of information between consumers and sellers; third, the idea that consumers suffer from cognitive biases that prevent them the proper assessment of nonsalient terms; fourth, the notion that suppliers – but not consumers – are concerned about their reputation in the market, what leads them to write contracts that protect from opportunistic consumers.

Key words: Adhesion Contracts, Law and Economics, Market Power, Information Asymmetry, Behavioral Economics, Reputation.

 

1,2 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

 

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