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A Política Fiscal como Um Jogo entre União, Estados e Municípios no Federalismo Fiscal Brasileiro

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v3n2p206-227

http://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/index 

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Liderau S. Marques Júnior1, Cristiano A. Oliveira2 & Eugenio Lagemann3

 

Resumo: O objetivo principal do presente trabalho é o de propor, utilizando o instrumental da teoria dos jogos, um modelo de política fiscal com competição tributária vertical que represente o caso brasileiro. No jogo de política fiscal entre União e um estado se consideram três situações: na primeira, as decisões são tomadas simultaneamente; na segunda, a União possui a vantagem de jogar primeiro levando em conta a reação do estado; e na terceira, propõe-se uma situação onde o estado detém o monopólio do poder de tributar. A partir dos dados da carga tributária da União e dos estados para o período de 1947 a 2009, são encontradas evidências empíricas que corroboram a discussão proposta.

Palavras-chave: Teoria dos Jogos; Competição Tributária; Política Fiscal; Federalismo Fiscal.

 

Abstract: Using game theory tools, the main purpose of this paper is to propose a model of fiscal policy with vertical tax competition which represents the Brazilian case. In a game of fiscal policy between federal government and one representative state three situations are considered: in the first, the decisions of fiscal policy are simultaneous; in the second, the federal government has first move advantage; and in the third it is proposed a situation where the state has the monopoly power to tax. Using the federal government and states tax rates over the 1947 to 2009 an empirical evidence for the proposed model is found.

Key words: Game Theory; Tax Competition; Fiscal Policy; Fiscal Federalism.

 

1 Fundação de Economia e Estatística Siegfried Emanuel Heuser (FEE). E-mail: liderau@fee.tche.br
2 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande (FURG) e PPGOM/UFPel. E-mail: cristiano.oliveira@furg.br
3 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). E-mail: eugenio.lagemann@gmail.com

 

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