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Responsabilidade Civil, Análise Econômica e o Princípio da Diferença

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v5n2p188-204



Leandro M. Zanitelli4


Resumo: O trabalho examina se um regime de responsabilidade civilminimizador dos custos de acidentes como preconizado pela análise econômica do direito pode ser requerido ou, ao menos, mostrar-se compatível com o princípio da diferença de Rawls. As conclusões são as seguintes. Se o principio da diferença for entendido como princípio que requer a maximização da riqueza dos cidadãos em desvantagem, então uma responsabilidade civil minimizadora de custos é parte necessária de uma ordem justa sch'lmdo o referido princípio. Há, todavia, algumas complicações decorrentes: a) da possibilidade de o princípio da diferença ser interpretado como principio não maximizador; b) de uma discrepância entre os sentidos do termo "riqueza" em Rawls c na análise econômica do direito; c c) de o princípio da diferença reh'lllar a distribuição de outros bens além da riqueza. Essas complicações não descartam, contudo, a compatibilidade de uma responsabilidade civil minimizadora de custos com o principio da diferença.

Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade Civil; AED; Princípio da Diferença; Rawls; Igualitarismo


Abstract: Thc arridc considcrs whcthcr a tort regime which minimizes accidem costs in rhe way preconized by economic analysis o f law may bc rcquircd or, at lcast, dccmcd compatible with Rawls's differcnce principie. Thc conclusions are as t~)llows. lf the difference principie is understood as a principie requiring wealth maximization for the least favored citizens, a tort regime minimizing accidem coses is a necessary component of a just institucional order according to such principie. Thcre are, nevcrthcless, some complications accruing from: a) thc fact that thc diffcrcncc principie may also be interpreted as a non-maximizing principie; b) a discrepancy between the meanings given to the term "wealth" by Rawls and economic analysis of law; and c) orher types of goods beyond wealrh whose disrribution is also govcrncd by thc diffcrcncc principie. Thcsc complications do not rulc out, howcver, the compatibility between a cost-minimizing tort law and the difference principie.

Key words: Tort Law; Economic Analysis o f Law; Difference Principie; Rawls, Egalitarianism


1 UFRGS. E-mail: leandrozanitelli@gmail.com.


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