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Influência da Política de Remuneração dos Executivos no Nível de Gerenciamento de Resultados em Empresas Industriais Brasileiras, Estadunidenses e Inglesas

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12702/D.G.Machado-TM-000000001

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MACHADO, Débora Gomes

 

Resumo: Um dos incentivos para a prática de gerenciamento de resultados advém dos contratos entre principal e agente. A remuneração do executivo se constitui em mecanismo de vinculação entre os mesmos, que se origina da Teoria da Agência, vislumbrando a redução de conflitos e de assimetria informacional. Disseminação expressiva de pesquisas sobre a remuneração dos executivos nos Estados Unidos foi identificada na revisão de literatura, com diferentes enfoques, e escassa na Inglaterra e no Brasil. Assim, o estudo objetivou identificar a influência da política de remuneração dos executivos no nível de gerenciamento de resultados sob a ótica das escolhas contábeis por meio de atividades operacionais e accruals discricionárias em empresas industriais brasileiras, estadunidenses e inglesas. Pesquisa descritiva com abordagem quantitativa foi realizada com aplicação do modelo de Murphy (1999) para segregar a remuneração dos executivos nas perspectivas de nível e estrutura; do modelo de Anderson, Banker e Janakiraman (2003), Gunny (2005), Roychowdhury (2005) e de Dechow, Sloan e Sweeney (1995) para estimar os níveis de gerenciamento de resultados. A coleta de dados foi documental e consideraram-se os exercícios de 2007 a 2010 para a remuneração dos executivos e de 2005 a 2010 para o gerenciamento de resultados. A amostra contou com 400 empresas industriais, sendo 30 brasileiras, 47 inglesas e 323 estadunidenses. Os resultados mostram que a remuneração dos executivos estadunidenses é maior do que a dos executivos brasileiros e ingleses, sendo que grande parte de sua remuneração é baseada em ações. O maior nível de gerenciamento de resultados por atividades operacionais, despesas com vendas, gerais e administrativas ocorreu nas empresas industriais inglesas, porém por accruals discricionárias foi maior nas empresas brasileiras. Conclui-se que há influência da política de remuneração no nível de gerenciamento de resultados, por meio de atividades operacionais e accruals discricionárias, e que a idade e expertise do executivo influenciam esta relação, assim como o segmento, desempenho e tamanho da empresa.

Palavras-chave: Remuneração de executivos, Gerenciamento de resultados, Manipulação de atividades operacionais, Manipulação de accruals discricionárias, Empresas industriais

 

Abstract: One incentive for the practice of earnings management comes from contracts between principal and agent. The executive compensation constitutes linking mechanism between them, which originates from the Theory of Agency, seeing the reduction of conflicts and information asymmetry. Dissemination of significant research on executive compensation in the United States was identified in the literature review, with different approaches, and scarce in England and Brazil. Thus, the study aimed to identify the influence of policy on executive compensation at the level of earnings management from the perspective of accounting choices by real activities and discretionary accruals in Brazilian, American and English, industrial companies. Descriptive study with quantitative approach was performed with application of the model of Murphy (1999) to segregate the compensation of executives in the prospects for the level and structure; model Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), Gunny (2005), Roychowdhury (2005) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) to estimate the levels of earnings management. Data collection was to document and consider the years 2007 to 2010 for executive compensation, and from 2005 to 2010 for earnings management. The sample consisted of 400 companies, 30 Brazilian, 47 British and 323 Americans. The results show that the American executive compensation is higher than that of Brazilian executives and English, with much of their compensation is based on shares. The highest level of earnings management by real activities, selling, general and administrative expenses occurred in English companies, but was higher discretionary accruals by Brazilian companies. We conclude that there is influence of the remuneration policy on the level of earnings management through discretionary accruals and real activities, and that age and expertise of the executive influence this relationship, as well as the segment, performance and company size.

Key words: Executive compensation, Earnings management, Real activities manipulation, Discretionary accruals manipulation, Industries companies

 

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